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ABSTRACT
In this work, we analyze some of the existing secret image
sharing methods and show that they do not possess indistin-
guishability, a property of many secure systems. We propose
a new method based on the (k, n) threshold secret sharing
scheme for images in the compressed and uncompressed do-
mains. Our method generates minimum share sizes with sim-
ilar computational cost as the previous methods, yet it is com-
putationally secure and satisfies the indistinguishability prop-
erty.
Index Terms— Secret image sharing, cryptanalysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The task of securing digital images has been studied exten-
sively in the past decade. The conventional approach to pro-
tect secret images is to use block encryption methods such as
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The block encryp-
tion techniques requires a key, which increases vulnerability
to attacks. Keeping the key at a single place or with a sin-
gle person is vulnerable to single point failure, as one person
cannot be trusted with the security of the key. Storing the
key at multiple locations further increases the possibility of
an attack because it increases the chances of access to more
adversaries.
In 1979, Shamir developed the first secret sharing method
[1]. The basic idea of his (k, n) threshold method is that
the secret to be shared is distributed to n participants and
any k ≤ n participants together can reconstruct the secret.
Any number of participants less than k cannot reconstruct the
secret. Applying Shamir secret sharing on images provides
information theoretically secure image sharing. However, if
the size of shares is important this basic scheme may not be
preferable because, using Shamir’s secret sharing, the size of
shares would be the same as the size of the secret image. Ide-
ally, we prefer the size of shares to be 1k of that of the size of
the secret image. Unfortunately, it is well known that we can-
not reduce the size of shares if we wish to have information
theoretic secrecy instead of computational secrecy [2].
Recently, many methods have been proposed to reduce
the size of shares in the computationally secure model [3] [4].
Although it is not mentioned in their work, their main idea is
to use the Reed-Solomon error correction scheme, which has
similarity to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Reed-Solomon
correction scheme can be used for information dispersal but
not for hiding information as we will show in this paper.
In computationally secure model, a basic method is, per-
haps, to encrypt the image using a secret key and then apply
Shamir’s scheme only on the secret encryption key. In this
method, every user will get the same copy of the encrypted
image and a share of the secret encryption key. Although
this method may be computationally more efficient (depend-
ing on k, n and the encryption method) than the basic method
mentioned earlier, the size of shares is again the same as the
size of the original image. In [2], it was proposed to use the
above method followed by an information dispersal scheme
to reduce the size of shares. Our proposed method is based
on this general approach. In particular, our proposed method
mixes a simple stream cipher with the Reed-Solomon correc-
tion method to reduce the computational complexity and to
reduce the size of shares to 1k of that of the original image.
2. CRYPTANALYSIS OF EXISTING SECRET IMAGE
SHARING SCHEMES
In this section, we first discuss the implementation of the ex-
isting secret image sharing schemes. Then, we perform crypt-
analysis to show that they are semantically insecure. All the
mathematical operations throughout this paper are in finite
fields.
2.1. Thein and Lin’s Method
Thein and Lin [3] proposed a secret image sharing scheme
based on the Reed-Solomon correction scheme. In their pro-
posed method, the secret image is divided into several sec-
tions in such a way that each section has k pixels and each
pixel of the image belongs to only one section. The polyno-
mial of the order (k−1) is constructed using the k consecutive
pixels of the same section, as follows:
fj(x) =
k−1∑
i=0
di,j × xi (1)
where fj(x) is the polynomial function for the jth section,
di,j is the value of the ith pixel in the jth section. The
mth share image is then the pair (m, sm), where sm =
(f1(m), f2(m), . . . ). In this method, the size of the share
images is reduced by 1k as the number of sections is
1
k of the
size of the image.
2.2. Alharthi and Atrey’s Method
Alharthi and Atrey [4] proposed an improvement to Thein and
Lin’s [3] method. In this method, the secret image is divided
into k sections, and the polynomial is constructed using the
pixel values from each of these k sections as follows:
fj(x) =
k−1∑
i=0
dj,i × xi (2)
where dj,i is the value of the jth pixel in the ith sec-
tion. The mth share image is again (m, sm), where sm =
(f1(m), f2(m), . . . ). Note that in this method the coefficients
of a polynomial come from different sections while in the
Thein and Lin’s method they come from a single section.
2.3. Lin and Tsai’s Method
Lin and Tsai [5] proposed a (k, n) secret sharing scheme
for compressed images. Using the first coefficient value in
the DCT block as a seed, a sequence of random numbers
are generated to replace the initial coefficients in the 8 × 8
block. The 2nd through 10th coefficients are calculated as
C ′m = Rm × Cm respectively, where C ′m is the new value
generated, Rm is the random number generated in the range
[0, C1], C1 is the first coefficient value, Cm is the original
AC coefficient value, and m is 2, 3, . . . , 10. The remaining
AC coefficients in the DCT block are discarded. Then the
first coefficient C1 is encrypted using Shamir’s secret shar-
ing scheme into n shares and p is taken as the nearest prime
number larger than C1. Random numbers are generated in the
range [0, p].
2.4. Security Issue of Existing Schemes
Let I be an image which we represent as a sequence of num-
bers, i.e., I = (a1, . . . , ar), where (a1, . . . , ar) are the pixel
values of the image I and r is the total number of pixels in I .
For simplicity, we assume that k divides r, where k is the min-
imum number of users required to generate the original image
for (k, n) secret image sharing. For security reasons, in Thein
and Lin’s [3] method, a random permutation is applied to I .
The random permutation is computed using a permutation key
K. Thein and Lin [3] proposed keeping the permutation key
with the owner or shared among the users. To analyze the
security of their method, we consider two cases: i) attacker
has access to the permutation key, ii) attacker does not pos-
sess the permutation key. In both cases, we show that their
method and its variants are insecure.
2.4.1. Case 1: Attacker has access to the permutation key
In the first case, suppose that the attacker has the following: i)
the permutation key K, ii) a single share image (m, sm), and
iii) an image J . Having a single share, the objective of the
attacker is to verify whether J is the secret image. Clearly,
the secret sharing scheme is not secure if an attacker can do
the above verification with a non-negligible probability.
To do the verification, the attacker can use the following
basic verification method:
1. Apply the secret sharing method on J . Note that this is
possible since attacker has the permutation key.
2. Compare the generated share image with sm.
3. Return true if there is a match; return false otherwise.
Note that if J is the secret image, the above basic verification
method will always return true. The following proposition
states that the probability of false alarm is very small if J
is a random image. Note that the same method can be used
against Alharthi and Atrey [4] method; the difference being
that the values used to construct the polynomial equation will
be the first unused pixels of each of k sections.
Proposition 1. Let I be the secret image, (m, sm) be a share
generated by the Thein and Lin’s method, and J be a random
image (i.e., J is a sequence of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) random numbers with uniform distribution).
The probability that the verification method apply to J returns
true is exp(− rk log q), where q is the size of the finite field.
Proof sketch. Let s′m be share generated by applying the se-
cret sharing method on J . Since J is a random image with
uniform distribution, s′m will also be a sequence of i.i.d ran-
dom numbers (from the finite filed) with uniform distribution.
Therefore, we have
Pr(s′m = sm) = Pr
 rk∧
i=1
(s′m(i) = sm(i))
 = (1
q
) r
k
,
where sm(i) (s′m(i)) denotes the i
th number in sm (s′m).
2.4.2. Case 2: Attacker does not have the permutation key
In the second case, we assume that the attacker does not pos-
sess the permutation key K. We show that the attacker can
still gain information by having only one share. Suppose that
the attacker has the share (1, s1). We have
r/k∑
i=0
s1(i) =
∑
a∈I
a.
Therefore, an image J cannot be the secret image if
r/k∑
i=0
s1(i) 6=
∑
a∈J
a (3)
An attacker can verify whether J is the secret image by
using (3), for which it does not require to know the permuta-
tion key. In this case the probability of false alarm is 1q if J is
a random image.
Proposition 2. Let I be the secret image, (1, s1) be a share
generated by the Thein and Lin’s method, and J be a ran-
dom image (i.e., J is a sequence of i.i.d random numbers with
uniform distribution). Then
Pr
r/k∑
i=0
s1(i) =
∑
a∈J
a
 = 1
q
.
Proof sketch. Note that
∑
a∈J a is a random finite field num-
ber with uniform distribution.
We can extend this attack to Alharthi and Atrey’s [4]
method. Similarly, we can prove that Lin and Tsai’s [5]
method is semantically insecure. We know that the adversary
has a share image (m, sm). The adversary selects an image J
which is to be verified and obtains its 64 DCT coefficients of
8×8 block. Now the adversary can pick the first value of each
block, and use it as a seed to generate a sequence of random
numbers. Then it can be compared to the AC values of the
share image since these are made public. If the values of the
share image does not match the generated value C ′I of image
J then we know that the image J is not the secret image.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
To overcome the above-mentioned weakness of the existing
secret image sharing methods, we propose a simple and effi-
cient (k, n) threshold scheme. We show the implementation
of the proposed scheme for uncompressed and compressed
images. The two phases (share generation and secret recon-
struction) of our scheme are described as follows.
3.1. Share Generation Phase
1. Perform encryption on the secret image I . In uncom-
pressed domain, the pixels values of the image and
in compressed domain the DCT coefficients are added
with pseudorandom numbers generated using a crypto-
graphically secure pseudo random number generator to
obtain the encrypted image E.
2. Using Reed Solomon error correction, the en-
crypted image E is partitioned into n fragments
E1, E2, . . . , En.
3. Using Shamir’s secret sharing, we generate n shares of
the seed (K1,K2, . . . ,Kn), used to generate random
numbers for the encryption part.
4. Each share si = (Ei,Ki), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is distributed to
the ith user.
Fig. 1. Color image of Lena and its first three shares
Note that the security of the above scheme depends on the
security of the pseudo random function used.
3.2. Secret Reconstruction Phase
1. Collect any k shares from the participants.
2. Using Reed-Solomon correction scheme reconstruct E
from the shares collected, Ei, i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
3. Using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme recover the seed
value K out of Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , k shares.
4. Decrypt E to recover the secret image I , by first gener-
ating random numbers using the seed constructed in the
previous step, and then subtracting the random numbers
from the reconstructed encrypted image E.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Experimental Results
We have used Lena and Baboon (gray scale and color) images
for our experiments. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the share
images generated for Lena color and gray Baboon images, re-
spectively. We compare the methods for computational speed
in both compressed and uncompressed domains experimen-
tally (by reporting the actual computation times) as well as
analytically (based on the number of operations performed in
each method and the number of random values used for share
creation). The share creation times for various uncompressed
and compressed images are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, re-
spectively. These times were recorded using a i5 processor,
2.67GHz Intel machine with 4 GB RAM. As per the results it
can be seen that our method is a little faster when compared
to [3] [5] and slightly slower than [4] as shown in Table 1
and Table 2,and perceptually secure as shown in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 where the share images are noisy and reveal no in-
formation about the secret image and there is a reduction in
the size of the share image by 1k similar to [3], [4].
Considering the number of finite field operations required
in each method, Thein and Lin’s method has to perform a per-
mutation of r pixels, (k − 1) × rk addition and (k − 1) × rk
Fig. 2. Baboon gray image and its first three shares
Table 1. Share creation times for uncompressed images
Image Thein and Alharthi and Proposed
Lin [3] Atrey [4] method
Lena-gray 147ms 94ms 96ms
Baboon-gray 133ms 83ms 90ms
Lena color 177ms 101ms 109ms
Baboon color 158ms 80ms 97ms
multiplication operations. Although Alharthi and Atrey’s [4]
method has to perform only (k − 1) × rk additions and
(k−1)× rk multiplications, it involves generating new values
of x everytime equation (2) is used. Our proposed method
has to perform (2k− 1)× rk additions and (k− 1)× rk multi-
plication operations in uncompressed domain. In compressed
domain, Lin and Tsai’s [5] method performs (k − 1) × r8×8
addition and (10× r8×8 +2× r8×8 ) multiplications. Our pro-
posed method has to perform (2k − 1) × r8×k additions and
(k − 1) × r8×k multiplication operations. Our method has
slightly more computational overhead than [4] and has com-
parable computational overhead with [3] and [5] even though
our method has more number of addition operations to be per-
formed, since [3] implements a permutation step which is not
performed in our method and the number of multiplication
operations to be performed in [5] is very much higher when
compared to our method, which conforms to the experimen-
tal results (Table 1 and Table 2). Furthermore, in terms of the
number of random bits required,Thein and Lin’s [3] method
needs θ(r log r) random bits to perform the random permu-
tation while our method requires θ(r log q) random bits for
the stream cipher, where q is the size of the finite field used.
Note that q is typically less than r in practice. Hence we show
that our method has the same computational cost as the other
methods based on the number of finite field operations per-
formed.
4.2. Security Analysis
Suppose that the attacker has access to k − 1 shares, and
wishes to know whether a given image J is the secret image.
Following we informally explain why the attacker is compu-
Table 2. Share creation times for compressed images
Image Lin and Tsai [5] Proposed method
Lena 94ms 77ms
Baboon 110ms 83ms
tationally unable to do this despite of possessing k−1 shares.
We refer the reader to [2] for more details.
We can assume that the attacker possesses E, as this does
not put the attacker in a weaker position. Note that having
E, one can generate all the shares, therefore, an attacker with
k − 1 shares is not more powerful than the one with E. If the
generated random numbers were truly random, the attacker
could not gain any information by possessing E. In other
words, for any image J we have Pr(J = I|E) = Pr(J =
I). Since it is computationally difficult to distinguish between
a sequence of numbers generated by the random number gen-
erator and a sequence of true random numbers, having E, the
attacker is computationally unable to gain any information.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a cryptanalysis of some of the ex-
isting secret image sharing methods. We showed how to solve
the issue by proposing a simple and efficient method that uses
random numbers along with the pixel/coefficient value to gen-
erate the shares. The proposed method reduces the size of
shares to its optimum, that is 1k of the size of the original
image. We compared the computation costs of our method
with the existing ones through quoting the number of finite
field operations and execution time. The results show that our
method has similar computation costs as the methods studied
in this work.
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